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Why do fundraisers announce initial contributions to their charity?
Potential explanations are that these announcements cause future donors
to increase their contributions, either because they want to reciprocate
the generosity of earlier donors, or because the initial contributions are
seen as a signal of the charity’s quality. Using experimental methods we
investigate these two hypotheses. When only the ﬁrst donor is informed
of the public good’s quality, subjects not only copy the initial contribu-
tion, but the ﬁrst donor also correctly anticipates this response. While
this result is consistent with both the signaling and the reciprocity expla-
nations, the latter is unlikely to be the driving force. The reason is that
announcements have no eﬀect on contribution levels when the quality of
the public good is common knowledge. Thus our results provide strong
support for the signaling hypothesis. (JEL C92, D82, H41)
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Fundraisers often rely on a sequential solicitation strategy when asking for con-
tributions. For instance, during fund drives potential donors may be informed
of past contributions and in particular of major individual contributions. Cap-
ital campaigns are typically launched by the announcement of a large “leader-
ship” contribution, and new donors and their pledged amounts are made public
throughout the campaign. Churches collect contributions in open baskets, and
recurring fundraising campaigns inform donors of previous contributions made
in the local community or at the latest charity event.1 Surprisingly there has
been limited empirical research on such sequential strategies. One exception is
Silverman, Robertson, Middlebrook, and Drabman (1984). They examine data
from a 20-hour national telethon in which three diﬀerent funding schemes were
employed. Their results show that announcing the names of individuals pledg-
ing money and the amount of money pledged resulted in greater contributions
than when they were not announced.
From a theoretical viewpoint the frequent use of announcements at ﬁrst
seemed puzzling to economists. Comparing a no-announcement contribution
game with an announcement game where donors contribute one at a time, Var-
ian (1994) shows that private contributions are largest when donors are unin-
formed of the contributions made by others. This result, however, relies on
the assumption that the donors can commit to giving only once. Relaxing this
assumption, predicted contribution levels with and without an announcement
are identical. Thus a fundraiser will achieve no additional gain by announcing
previous contributions.
Why then do fundraisers appear to be far from indiﬀerent between announc-
ing and not announcing past contributions? A number of alternative expla-
nations have been provided. One is that announcements provide the donors
with prestige or the ability to signal their wealth.2 That is, announcements
1Edles (1993) recommends that fundraisers inform future donors of the number of donors
and the total amount that they have contributed.
2Andreoni (1988, 1990), Harbaugh (1998), Glaeser and Konrad (1996), Olson (1965), and
Steinberg (1989).
1may eﬀectively add a private beneﬁt to the contribution, thereby increasing the
marginal beneﬁt of giving. While compelling, this explanation does not address
the commonly held belief that announcements not only increase the leader’s
contribution, but also increase the future contributions of others. For instance,
the chairman of the trustees of Johns Hopkins explains that the reason that the
university asks donors for permission to announce their gifts is that “fundamen-
tally we are all followers. If I can get somebody to be the leader, others will
follow. I can leverage that gift many times over.”3
One case in which theory predicts that announcements will aﬀect the con-
tributions of those who follow is when the payoﬀ of the public good is discon-
tinuous. Andreoni (1998) examines the case where a threshold of contributions
m u s tb er e a c h e dt os e c u r ep r o v i s i o n . I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n tt h e r em a yb e
multiple equilibria, some of which do not result in provision of the public good.
Andreoni shows that announcements may allow donors to coordinate on a posi-
tive provision outcome. Similarly, if there is a discrete increase in payoﬀsa tt h e
completion of a project, Marx and Matthews (2000) show that sequential provi-
sion may result in a positive provision outcome, even when no such equilibrium
exists in the simultaneous game. Thus in a threshold environment announce-
ments may increase contributions. Unfortunately this explanation does not help
us understand why fundraisers choose to announce contributions when raising
funds for a public good without a threshold.4 Indeed the evidence by Silverman
et al. (1984) suggests that announcements also will be successful when provision
is strictly increasing in the contribution level. Similarly a recent experiment by
List and Lucking-Reiley (2001) demonstrates that large initial contributions will
increase future contributions in a non-threshold environment.5
3The New York Times, February 2, 1997, p. 10.
4While fundraisers may combine an announcement strategy with an announced contribu-
tion goal for the campaign, these goals are not generally binding and hence the underlying
technology of the public good is continuous. See Morelli and Vesterlund (2000) for examples
and an examination of the fundraiser’s incentive to truncate a continuous production function.
5List and Lucking-Reiley (2001) ﬁnd that increasing the initial contribution from 10% to
67% of the campaign goal produces a nearly six-fold increase in subsequent contributions.
While the objective for each solicitation was to provide funds for a computer, the letter made
clear that insuﬃcient or excessive funds would be put to alternative use within the organi-
zation. Thus provision was increasing with contributions. Consistent with the continuous
production technology is the fact that their results are the same when contributions are re-
funded when they are short of the goal (see Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989, and Pecorino and
2In a non-threshold environment a possible explanation for the positive corre-
lation between initial and subsequent contributions is that the initial announce-
ments serve as a signal that reveals information about the quality of the public
good. Vesterlund (2001) shows that charities prefer to announce past contribu-
tions when there is imperfect information about the good’s quality. The reason
is that when the initial donor is informed about the charity’s quality, then the
fundraiser can credibly make this information common knowledge by announc-
ing the level of the ﬁrst contribution. For high-quality charities, announcements
generate contributions that exceed those that arise when past contributions are
not announced, and furthermore the contributions exceed the level that results
when the charity’s quality is common knowledge. Thus announcements not
only help high-quality charities to be recognized as being worthwhile, but it
also enables them to reduce the traditional free-rider problem.
A second explanation for the eﬀectiveness of announcements in non-threshold
environments may be that announcements trigger a social norm of reciprocity.
Reciprocity generally refers to a conditional obligation, where decisions are
made sequentially and actors are informed about previous decisions. In se-
quential games it has frequently been shown that people tend to be kind to
those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have been unkind.6
If reciprocity extends to charitable giving then it will cause contributions to be
positively correlated with previous contributions. In particular, the information
that others have already made a (large) contribution may evoke a social oblig-
ation on future donors to reciprocate. Thus fundraisers may have an incentive
to publicly announce previous contributions because it allows them to forcefully
trigger a reciprocity norm.
The objective of this paper is to examine the role of announcements in a
n o n - t h r e s h o l de n v i r o n m e n ta n di np a r t i cular to more carefully investigate the
reciprocity and signaling hypotheses. We report results from a series of exper-
iments designed to answer two questions: First, in an asymmetric information
environment do announcements cause contributions to increase? Second, if con-
Temimi, 2001).
6See Fehr and Gächter (2000) for references and an overview of the importance of reci-
procity.
3tributions are higher with announcements, could this be due to reciprocity rather
than signaling? We examine a simple environment, where there are two poten-
tial donors. The donors’ information is exogenously determined, and charitable
contributions correspond to contributions to a linear public good. In two of
our treatments the ﬁrst potential donor, but not the second, is informed of the
quality of the public good, and we examine the eﬀect of informing the follower
of the leader’s contribution. According to the signaling hypothesis, higher con-
tributions are predicted when the leader’s contribution is announced. In order
to assess whether reciprocity may account for any increase in contributions we
conduct two additional treatments to examine the eﬀect of announcements when
both donors are fully informed of the quality of the public good. These four
treatments allow us to test the predictive force of the signaling hypothesis and
also to calibrate the eﬀect of reciprocity considerations.
Our results are broadly consistent with the signaling hypothesis. Followers
in the asymmetric-information treatment tend to mimic the leaders’ contribu-
tions, and leaders anticipate this inference. Thus leaders internalize the best
response of subsequent donors, so that the leader’s private incentives become
aligned with that of the group. As a result announcements cause a substantial
increase in contributions. In contrast announcements have a negligible eﬀect on
contributions when the quality of the public good is common knowledge. Thus,
our results show that announcements are preferred in some environments but
not in others, and that reciprocity is unlikely to be the reason why announce-
ments are eﬀective when the charity’s quality is not common knowledge.
In the next section of the paper we derive the comparative static predictions
of the signaling model and describe how these diﬀer from a model of reciprocity.
In section 3 we describe our experimental design, and we present the results
of the experiment in section 4. In section 5 we discuss our ﬁndings in light of
past experimental results and examine the practical implications of our results.
Finally section 6 concludes the paper.
42 A Signaling Model of Voluntary Contributions
The signaling hypothesis posits that early contributions may serve as a signal of
a charity’s quality. The key ideas can be illustrated by means of a simple model
in which charitable donations are treated as contributions to a linear public
good. This model will serve as the basis for our experiment.
There are two players, Player 1 and Player 2, each with a unit endowment.
Each player decides whether to allocate his endowment to a private good (xi =
0) or a public good (xi =1 ), where the marginal per capita return from the
public good is denoted by m.T h ep a y o ﬀ functions are:
πi =1− xi + m(x1 + x2),
for i =1 ,2, where the value of m is drawn by Nature from a commonly known
probability distribution. In this environment a fully eﬃcient outcome (in the
sense of joint payoﬀ maximization) requires that no player contributes if m<1
2
and both players contribute if m>1
2.
We will consider a number of diﬀerent versions of this contribution game.
Consider ﬁrst the case where the sequence of events is as follows. Nature draws
m. Player 1 is informed of the value of m before she chooses her contribution
x1. Player 2 is informed of Player 1’s decision, but not of the true value of m.
Then, Player 2 chooses his contribution x2.F i n a l l y ,p a y o ﬀs are determined and
the game ends.
In this game Player 2 can try to make inferences about the value of m
from Player 1’s decision, and Player 1 may adjust her contribution decision
in anticipation of these inferences. To illustrate how this works assume that
E[m] < 1,a n dt h a tE[m|m>1
2] ≥ 1. That is, on the basis of the prior
distribution the expected value of m is below unity, implying that contributing
to the public good is privately sub-optimal. However, if the return from the
public good is known to exceed 1
2, then the expected return of the public good
exceeds that from the private good, and it is privately optimal to contribute.
Under these assumptions the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium is for
P l a y e r1t oc h o o s ex1 =1if m>1
2 and to choose x1 =0if m<1
2.P l a y e r 2
5will follow the choice of Player 1, that is, x2 =1if x1 =1and x2 =0if x1 =0 .
In this equilibrium no player contributes if m<1
2 and both players contribute
if m>1
2. Thus a fully eﬃcient outcome is attained for every value of m.7
To illustrate the implication of the initial announcement, consider instead
the case where Player 2 is not informed of Player 1’s choice. Player 2 will now
base his decision on the prior distribution of m.G i v e nt h a tE[m] < 1,P l a y e r
2’s dominant strategy is not to contribute (x2 =0 ). Player 1 on the other hand
will still base her decision on the true value of m, however now she contributes
only when m>1.T h u s , c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e i n e ﬃcient when Player 2 is not
informed of 1’s decision. The equilibrium contribution levels for the two games
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Figure 1. Total Contributions with Asymmetric Information:
Sequential vs. Simultaneous Moves
With sequential moves, both players contribute when m>1
2,a n dw i t hs i m u l -
taneous moves, Player 2 never contributes and Player 1 contributes if m>1.
Whether Player 2 is informed about Player 1’s move thus has a substantial
7The weaker condition that Pr{m>1} > 0 ensures that signaling will occur in equilibrium,
and it leads to higher contributions (and joint payoﬀs )t h a ni nt h ec a s ew h e r eP l a y e r2i s
not informed of Player 1’s decision. Signaling will only induce a fully eﬃcient outcome if
E[m|m>1
2] ≥ 1.
6impact on the total contribution level. The signaling hypothesis of charitable
giving postulates that this increase in contributions is one of the reasons char-
ities publicly announce initial (leadership) contributions. To investigate this
hypothesis we will examine experimentally if announcements are eﬀective in
raising contributions when only Player 1 is informed of the quality of the public
good.
From an empirical perspective, the answer to this question is, ex ante, not
obvious. Even if subjects attempt to maximize own-earnings, the issues un-
derlying the signaling equilibrium are subtle and cognitively demanding.8 The
equilibrium conditions require not only that subjects in the role of Player 2 make
inferences from others’ decisions and behave accordingly, but also that subjects
in the role of Player 1 make their decisions in anticipation of these inferences.9
Signaling is not the only reason why we might ﬁnd that announcements
increase contributions. Abundant experimental evidence shows that subjects
cooperate in environments in which equilibrium (in the standard sense) would
predict non-cooperation. Moreover, several experimental studies have suggested
that such cooperation is of a reciprocal (i.e., conditional) nature. That is, kind
actions are followed by kind actions andu n k i n da c t i o n sa r er e p a i dw i t ha n
unkind response.10 The sequential structure of the present game is therefore
prone to reciprocal cooperation, and an increase in contributions may be due to
reciprocity rather than signaling. Certainly, if reciprocity leads to a substantial
amount of following behavior by Player 2 then a payoﬀ-maximizing Player 1
will be induced to contribute when m ∈ (1
2,1).
To assess whether reciprocity considerations might explain why sequential
8Earlier signaling experiments suggest that separating equilibrium have less drawing power
than pooling equilibria, especially when (perfect Bayesian) pooling and separating equilibria
exist simultaneously (Cadsby, Frank, and Maksimovic, 1990, 1998, Cooper, Garvin, and Kagel,
1997a, 1997b). The case for separation is better when it is the unique equilibrium. Even in
this case, however, it may take quite some time for play to develop towards separation (see
Cooper et al., 1997b).
9This anticipation is necessary because Player 1’s payoﬀ depends on Player 2’s decision.
This dependence is one aspect of the model that distinguishes it from the models of informa-
tional cascades. For an experimental examination of informational cascades see for example
Anderson and Holt (1997).
10Although there is wide agreement on the importance of reciprocity, there is less agreement
on how to explain or model it. See for example Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989),
Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk and
Fischbacher (1998), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998), and Charness and Rabin (2001).
7moves induce higher contributions we also examine the eﬀects of announcements
when the value of the public good is common knowledge. Finding a negligi-
ble eﬀect of announcements in this environment would suggest that reciprocity
cannot account for substantive diﬀerences between contributions in the asym-
metric sequential and simultaneous conditions. Furthermore, if contributions in
the full-information sequential-move case exceed those in the full-information
simultaneous-move case the diﬀerence gives us a measure of what proportion
of the eﬀect in the asymmetric-information environment is due to reciprocity
rather than signaling.
We ﬁrst determine whether announcements increase contributions in an
asymmetric-information environment, and subsequently we examine whether a
potential increase in contributions may be explained by reciprocity. To address
these questions four versions of the basic public goods game are implemented.
Two move structures (sequential versus simultaneous) are combined with two
information conditions about the public good’s return (full versus asymmetric).
The next section outlines how these versions of the game were implemented
experimentally.
3 Experiment
We examined a two-person public goods environment under four diﬀerent in-
formational treatments. Speciﬁcally we examine treatments where Player 2 is
either informed or uninformed of the quality of the public good and/or Player
1’s contribution. This 2 × 2 experimental design is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Player 2’s Information
Return from the public good:
Observable Unobservable
Player 1’s Observable Seq_Full Seq_Asym
contribution: Unobservable Sim_Full Sim_Asym
W er a nf o u rs e s s i o n so fe a c ho ft h ef o u rt r e a t m e n t s ,w i t h1 2s u b j e c t si ne a c h
session, for a total of 192 subjects. Subjects were recruited from a pool of under-
8graduate students at the University of Nottingham, and randomly assigned to a
treatment. No subject participated in more than one session of the experiment.
All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly
assigned a computer terminal and a role as ﬁrst- or second mover. Subjects
retained their role throughout the session. In total, 24 subjects were observed
in each role of each of the four treatments. This allocation of roles was described
in a set of written instructions that the experimenter read aloud.11 As part of the
instructional phase, subjects completed a quiz on how to calculate the payoﬀs
of the game. The experimenter checked that all subjects had completed the
quiz correctly before continuing with the instructions. Subjects were allowed to
ask questions by raising their hand and speaking to the experimenter in private.
Subjects were not allowed to communicate with one another throughout the
session, except via the decisions they entered on their terminal.
The decision-making phase of the session consisted of 18 rounds. In each
round ﬁrst movers were randomly and anonymously paired with second movers,
with the stipulation that no one played another subject twice in a row, and
that no pair of subjects would be matched more than three times.12 Subjects’
identities were never revealed to anyone.
In each round the subjects were given the choice between two actions: A
or B. Choosing A gave the individual a certain private return of 40 pence. By
choosing B both players received a return of 0, 30, or 60 pence. In terms of
the model in section 2, choosing A corresponds to not contributing (xi =0 )
and B corresponds to contributing (xi =1 ). The return from A of 40 pence
corresponds to one payoﬀ unit, and the return from B corresponds to either
m =0 , 0.75 or 1.5 payoﬀ units.
At the beginning of each round ﬁrst movers were informed of the return from
B a n dw e r ep r o m p t e dt oc h o s eA or B.W h e na l lﬁrst movers had chosen, second
movers were either informed of the return from B (full-information treatment)
or told that each of the three values was equally likely (asymmetric-information
11Reading the instructions aloud caused the structure of the game to become common
information. A copy of the instructions for the experiment can be found in Appendix I.
12The matching scheme was randomly generated prior to the experiment and used in all
sessions.
9treatment). Similarly the second mover was either informed of ﬁrst mover’s
choice of A or B (sequential treatment) or not informed (simultaneous treat-
ment). The second mover then made a choice between A and B.13 At the end
of each round, subjects were informed of choices and payoﬀsi nt h e i rg a m e ,a s
well as the actual return from B, and they recorded these on a record sheet.
At the end of round 18, subjects were paid their earnings from all 18 rounds
in private. All sessions lasted less than an hour and subjects earned an average
of £11.52 (with a minimum of £6.90 and a maximum of £13.80).
Assuming that all subjects aim to maximize their own earnings and that
this is common knowledge we get the following predictions in each of the four
treatments. In the full-information treatments (Seq_Full and Sim_Full) both
players choose A when m =0or 0.75, and both choose B when m=1.5.I nt h e
Seq_Asym treatment both players choose A when m =0 ,a n db o t hc h o o s eB
when m =0 .75 and 1.5. Finally, in the Sim_Asym treatment the uninformed
second mover always chooses A, and the informed ﬁrst mover chooses B when
m =1 .5,a n dA otherwise.
For each session of the experiment a total of 108 joint decisions were made
(6 pairs × 18 rounds). The corresponding sequence of 108 values of m was
randomly drawn prior to the experiment, with m =0b e i n go b s e r v e d3 4t i m e s ,
m =0 .75 a total of 39 times, and m =1 .5 a total of 35 times. This same
sequence provided the values of the return from B for all sessions. From this
sequence it is easy to determine the predicted contribution and earnings level
in each treatment of the experiment. Table 2 summarizes these predictions.
Table 2: Equilibrium Predictions
x1 x2 x1 + x2 Expected π1(£) Expected π2(£)
Seq_Asym 74 74 148 13.2 13.2
Sim_Asym 35 0 35 8.4 10.7
Seq_Full 35 35 70 11.9 11.9
Sim_Full 35 35 70 11.9 11.9
Table 2 makes clear that announcements are predicted to have an eﬀect only
in the asymmetric-information environment and that this is the only case in
13Note that all sessions have sequential moves in the sense of priority in time.
10which the equilibrium will be Pareto eﬃcient.
4R e s u l t s
In our analysis of the data we provide answers to the two questions posed in
Section 2. First, do announcements increase contributions in an asymmetric-
information environment, and, second, may a potential increase in contribu-
tions be due to reciprocity? Since both the signaling and reciprocity hypotheses
are consistent with ﬁnding that announcements increase contributions in the
asymmetric-information treatment an aﬃrmative answer to the ﬁrst question
will not allow us to distinguish between the two hypotheses. If, however, an-
nouncements are equally successful when both donors know the value of the
good, then it is unlikely that signaling is the explanation for its success in the
asymmetric treatment.
4.1 Do Announcements Increase Contributions when there
is Asymmetric Information?
The equilibrium prediction is that announcements increase contributions when
only the ﬁrst mover knows the public good’s quality. The evidence from the
asymmetric-information treatments strongly supports this prediction. As shown
in Figure 2 announcements increase individual and total contributions by more
than 50%. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels,
even using a conservative test that uses each session as the unit of observa-
tion (see Appendix II for details). Thus actual behavior is consistent with the
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Figure 2: Average Contribution per Session
(second mover uninformed)
What causes this increase in contributions? The answer is twofold. First,
our results show that with announcements the second mover is very likely to
mimic the decision of the ﬁrst mover. Second, it appears that the ﬁrst mover
correctly anticipates this response. When the ﬁrst mover contributes, we observe
80.6% of second movers mimicking her behavior. In contrast, only 7.8% of
second movers choose to contribute when the ﬁrst mover does not contribute.
Hence, a contribution by the ﬁrst mover increases the contribution rate of second
movers by 72.8%-points. Although this increase is smaller than that predicted in
equilibrium (100%), it is suﬃcient to make contributions at m =0 .75 the payoﬀ-
maximizing strategy for the ﬁrst mover. The reason is that a rational ﬁrst mover
should contribute at m =0 .75 if she believes that doing so will increase the
probability that the second mover contributes by at least 33.3%-points. The
behavior of the ﬁrst mover suggests that the vast majority of them correctly
anticipate the second mover’s response. Figure 3 illustrates the ﬁrst movers’











Figure 3: Frequency of Contributions by the First Mover
Independent of announcements ﬁrst movers almost never contribute when
m =0 , and they almost always contribute when m =1 .5. The primary diﬀerence
between the two treatments is in ﬁrst-mover contributions when m =0 .75.
When the ﬁrst contribution is announced 75% of ﬁrst movers contribute when
m =0 .75; in contrast only 15% contribute in the absence of announcements.
Next we examine the eﬀect of announcements on earnings. Our results show
that announcements increase individual earnings by between 15-20%. While
substantial this increase is smaller than that predicted. Table 3 summarizes the
actual and predicted earnings. Earnings opportunities are not fully exploited
in the Seq_Asym treatments. The primary reason is that the second mover
occasionally fails to contribute when m =0 .75 or 1.5, causing observed earnings
to be 91% of the predicted (eﬃcient) level. Earnings in the Sim_Asym treat-
ments also diﬀer from the prediction. While ﬁrst-mover earnings are larger than
predicted, those of the second mover are smaller than predicted. This shortfall
arises because the second movers contribute about one third of the time in the
simultaneous treatment, with one third of these contributions being made when
m =0 , i.e., when the public good is worthless. Each such worthless contri-
bution constitutes a loss of 40 pence for second movers, but has no impact on
ﬁrst-mover earnings.
13Table 3: Average Earnings (£) per Subject per Session
First Second
movers movers
Seq_Asym predicted 13.2 13.2
observed 11.7 12.3
Sim_Asym predicted 8.4 10.7
observed 10.1 10.4
Though joint payoﬀs are higher than predicted in the simultaneous treat-
ment and lower than predicted in the sequential treatment, our results are still
consistent with the comparative static prediction that both players enjoy sig-
niﬁcantly higher earnings when the initial decision is observed (see Appendix II
for details). Combined with the larger overall contributions, both donors and a
contribution-maximizing fundraiser would prefer that the initial contributions
be announced in an asymmetric-information environment. As shown above the
explanation for this success is that second movers mimic the announced decision
of the ﬁrst mover, and that the ﬁrst mover correctly anticipates this response.
There are two reasons why the second mover may choose to mimic the decision
of the ﬁrst mover. It may be that the second mover simply wants to reciprocate
the kindness of the ﬁrst mover, or that he views the ﬁrst mover’s contribution as
a signal that the marginal beneﬁt from contributing is positive. To discriminate
between these two hypotheses of reciprocity and signaling we examine the eﬀect
of announcements when both ﬁrst and second movers know the quality of the
public good.
4.2 Is Reciprocity the Reason that Announcements In-
crease Contributions?
The announcement of the initial contribution may allow reciprocal subjects to
coordinate on contributing when m =0 .75. If reciprocity causes contributions
to increase with announcements, then we should expect that this also plays a
role when the quality of the public good is common knowledge.
In contrast to the asymmetric-information treatment, we ﬁnd that announce-
ments have a negligible eﬀect in the full-information treatment. Figure 4 il-
lustrates the average contributions by treatment. First movers give more, on
14average, when contributions are announced, and second movers give more when
they are not announced. Neither of these eﬀects is signiﬁcant (see Appendix II
for details). As a result we can reject the hypothesis that overall giving is larger
with announcements. Consistent with the equilibrium prediction we see that
announcements have little eﬀect in the full-information treatment, suggesting
that there is little support for the hypothesis that reciprocity is the driving force
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Figure 4: Average Contribution per Session
(full information)
In the asymmetric-information treatment we found a substantial degree of
following behavior when the second mover was informed about the choice of the
ﬁrst mover. In the full-information treatment this happens to a much lesser
extent. The interesting case is when m =0 .75. Conditional on the ﬁrst mover
contributing, the second mover contributes in 33.3% of the cases. If the ﬁrst
mover does not contribute, the second mover does not contribute either. Thus,
some degree of reciprocity is present, and by contributing, the ﬁrst mover can
increase the contribution rate of the second mover by 33.3%-points. This is
exactly the rate of increase that would make a rational risk-neutral ﬁrst mover
indiﬀerent towards contributing.14
14These results are remarkably close to those of Clark and Sefton (2001) for a sequential
15This raises the question of whether the ﬁrst mover is aﬀected by the an-
nouncement of her contribution. Figure 5 illustrates the ﬁrst mover’s likeli-
hood of contributing conditional on the value of m. Similar to the asymmetric-
information treatments (see Figure 3) we see that the ﬁrst mover generally con-
tributes when the value of m is 1.5 and doesn’t contribute when it is 0. The only
diﬀerence relative to the asymmetric-information treatment is that announce-
ments have a limited eﬀect on contributions when m =0 .75. Contributions
by the ﬁrst mover increase when her choice is announced to the second mover
(from 16% to 27%) but the increase is not nearly as large as in the asymmetric-
information treatment (from 15% to 75%). This should not be surprising in view
of the ﬁnding that in the full-information treatment there is much less following











Figure 5: Frequency of Contributions by the First Mover
Interestingly, with m =0 .75, the overall contribution rate by the second
mover is actually lower when ﬁrst-mover contributions are announced (9%) than
when these are not announced (27%). Thus, when there is full information, an-
nouncements have a negative eﬀect on second-mover contributions and a positive
prisoner’s dilemma with a payoﬀ structure that is comparable to our full-information game
with m =0 .75. In their baseline treatment the rate at which the second mover cooperates
increases by about 35%, whereas the increase needed to make cooperation a best response for
the ﬁrst-mover is 25%. Clark and Sefton do not study a simultaneous move game to which
results can be compared.
16eﬀect on ﬁrst-mover contributions.15
The eﬀect of announcements on earnings is also limited. Given the diﬀering
contribution patterns of the two donors it is not surprising that announcements
decrease ﬁrst donor earnings while increasing those of the second donor. The
overall eﬀect on total earnings is an insigniﬁcant decrease of 1% (see Appendix
II for details).
In summary, our data show that announcements are ineﬀective in increasing
the overall contribution level when both donors know the value of the public
good. This suggests that it is unlikely that the substantial increase in contribu-
tions in the asymmetric-information treatment is caused by reciprocity.
5 Discussion
Although we frequently observe fundraisers announcing past contributions, our
results suggest that the success of such a strategy depends on the informational
environment. While announcements have a negligible eﬀect on contributions in
the full-information environment, we ﬁnd that they cause a substantial increase
in contributions in the asymmetric-information environment. This result indi-
cates that announcements are successful because they enable the ﬁrst mover
to signal that the public good is worthwhile.16 Relative to previous signaling
experiments it is striking how quickly subjects behave according to the equi-
librium prediction of the game. Previous studies have found that it takes time
for strategic play to develop. For example, in the entry limit pricing game of
Cooper, Garvin, and Kagel (1997b) play consistently starts oﬀ with the ﬁrst
mover choosing her myopic maximum, that is, the choice that would maximize
her payoﬀs if she ignores the eﬀect of her choice on the choice of the second
mover. Similarly the second mover typically starts oﬀ a tt h em y o p i cm a x i m u m ,
15Van der Heijden et al. (2001) compare sequential and simultaneous moves in a gift-
exchange experiment and ﬁnd a similar eﬀect. Rather than furthering the overall rate of
cooperation, a sequential move structure mainly seemed to aﬀect the strategic positions of the
players, putting the ﬁrst-mover in a weaker position and the second-mover in a stronger one.
16Romano and Yildirim (2001) provide an alternative explanation for announcements. In
a full-information environment they show that donors, who are suﬃciently concerned about
the warm-glow of giving, may give more in a sequential game. The results from our full-
information treatment rule out the possibility that this explanation is what causes the success
of announcement in the asymmetric-information environment.
17ignoring the information that is contained in the choice of the ﬁrst mover. Only
with suﬃcient repetition does play converge to equilibrium.
In our Seq_Asym treatment strategic behavior develops almost immediately.
If the ﬁrst mover anticipates that the second mover will follow her choice she
should contribute when the return is 0.75, but if she ignores this response she
should not contribute (not contributing is the myopic maximum when m =
0.75). Already in the ﬁrst round we ﬁnd that ﬁr s tm o v e r sc o n t r i b u t ea tar a t e
of 75% when they are confronted with a return of m =0 .75. Similarly, the
myopic maximum for the second mover is not to contribute. We ﬁnd, however,
that conditional on the ﬁrst mover contributing second movers contribute at a
rate of 69% in the ﬁrst round.
One reason why equilibrium play develops rapidly may be that the equilib-
rium of the game is unique (see also Cadsby et al., 1990). Note however that
uniqueness does not generally secure rapid convergence to equilibrium. For ex-
ample, the lemons market experiments with cheap talk in Forsythe, Lundholm,
and Rietz (1999) are also characterized by a unique (pooling) equilibrium. Yet
play shows only a very weak tendency to converge toward the equilibrium. It
may be that another reason that signaling works so well in our experiment is
that the equilibrium is eﬃcient and results in symmetric payoﬀs to the players,
implying that at equilibrium there is no conﬂict between own-payoﬀ maximiza-
tion, eﬃciency, or equity. Although, as we have seen in section 4.2, other-
regarding preferences are insuﬃcient to trigger support for reciprocity in the
full-information environment, it may be that these same preferences enhance the
behavioral attraction of the signaling equilibrium in the asymmetric-information
environment.
Our experimental results support the theoretical prediction that fundrais-
ers prefer to announce past contributions in an asymmetric-information en-
vironment. It is interesting to ask whether such an environment could arise
endogenously. Theoretically, this question can be addressed by explicitly in-
corporating information acquisition into the model. For example assume that
potential donors, just before donating, are given the private option to purchase
a perfectly informative and private signal on the charity’s quality. Consider ﬁrst
18the symmetric cases where both donors are equally informed. In the event that
information is costless both donors will know the value of the charity, and when
the cost of information is suﬃciently large neither donor becomes informed.17 In
both cases the resulting contributions are Pareto inferior. Of interest is the fact
that there are intermediate costs at which only the ﬁrst mover purchases infor-
mation. The reason is that the beneﬁt of purchasing information is larger for the
ﬁrst mover than the second. When information costs are between 0.1 and 0.25
the resulting equilibrium is one where the ﬁrst mover is informed and the second
is not.18 Hence for this intermediate range of costs the asymmetric-information
environment will arise endogenously, and as shown experimentally this places
the contribution-maximizing fundraiser in a position where she prefers to an-
nounce the initial contribution.19
The theoretical predictions are that both the fundraiser and the donors will
prefer an environment where only the ﬁrst mover knows the value of the public
good. In our experiments, consistent with the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp r e d i c t i o n ,w es e e
in ﬁgure 6 that average contributions in the sequential asymmetric-information
treatment are 45% larger than those found in the sequential full-information
treatment (this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels of
signiﬁcance, see Appendix II).
17In equilibria where the ﬁrst mover has purchased information the second donor only
purchases information when the ﬁrst contribution is positive.
18Let c denote the cost of information. The equilibrium contributions in this endogenously
arising asymmetric-information environment is that the leader chooses x1 =0if m =0 ,a n d
chooses x1 =1−c if m =0 .75 or 1.5. The follower mimics the leader’s choice, that is, x2 =0
if x1 =0 ,a n dx2 =1if x1 =1−c. This equilibrium cannot be sustained for costs larger than
0.25 because the ﬁrst mover would prefer being uninformed and pretending as if she acquired
good information.
19Vesterlund (2001) presents this result in more detail and shows that this equilibrium can
be sustained when the fundraiser is informed of the charity’s quality and the announcement
decision is endogenous. Furthermore, she shows that the fundraiser has an optimal solicitation
ordering when presented when soliciting in a heterogeneous population, thus it will not be
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Figure 6: Average Contribution per Session
While our experimental results show that the fundraiser prefers the asym-
metric information environment, the results are less clear when comparing the
donors’ earnings in the two treatments. Earnings for ﬁrst and second movers are
only slightly higher in the asymmetric treatment than in the full information
one, and the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (see Appendix II). Figures 7 and 8 help
us reconcile the increase in contributions with the limited eﬀect on earnings.
Although both ﬁrst and second movers are more likely to contribute when m =
0.75 in the asymmetric-information treatment, this increase barely outweighs
the missed earnings opportunities when m =1 .5. Since some second movers
do not mimic the behavior of the ﬁrst movers, the likelihood of the second
mover contributing when m =1 .5 is only 76% in the asymmetric-information
treatment, whereas it is 97% in the full-information treatment. Thus, in those
instances in which the public good has a very high return, the uninformed donor
sometimes fails to provide valuable contributions. The result is a limited net






















Figure 8: Frequency of Contributions by the Second Mover
6C o n c l u s i o n
Equilibrium based on own-earnings maximization oﬀers sharp predictions about
contributions in our public-goods environment. It is not the case that every de-
cision by every subject conforms to these predictions, and the theory does not
provide an exact description of subjects’ behavior. Nonetheless, our experimen-
tal results suggest that the prediction is a good approximation, and the changes
21in contributions across our asymmetric-information treatments are broadly con-
sistent with the predicted comparative statics. When only the ﬁrst mover is
informed, announcements are very eﬀective. When the ﬁrst contribution is not
announced, second movers rarely contribute, and ﬁrst movers only contribute
when their return from the public good exceeds that of the private good. In
contrast, announcements cause second movers to copy ﬁrst-mover decisions, and
ﬁrst movers tend to contribute when it is collectively optimal to do so.
While consistent with the signaling hypothesis, second movers who are moti-
vated by reciprocity are likely to behave in a similar manner. However, our ﬁnd-
ing that announcements have no eﬀect on contributions in the full-information
environment suggests that reciprocity has a limited role in explaining the success
of announcements in the asymmetric-information environment.
Much research on public goods has been done within a complete and perfect
information environment; our ﬁndings should encourage both empirical and
theoretical investigations of the role of information in charitable giving. We have
focused on environments in which the informational structure is exogenous, but
obvious questions arise as to how the informational structure is determined and
how it aﬀects giving. While the theoretical prediction is that an asymmetric-
information environment may arise endogenously, it is of interest to determine
experimentally whether this is the case. Are subjects willing to provide or
purchase information? Will they try to manipulate others into thinking that
they are informed donors? How will this depend on underlying preference and
technology parameters? And how will the endogenous provision of information
aﬀect contributions and welfare?
We view the results from our simple environment as promising, and see them
as evidence that further experimental research within richer frameworks may be
fruitful. Another promising avenue for future work is to examine more carefully
the behavior of donors in light of some of the new theoretical work in this area.
For example, one of the predictions of the signaling model is that the fundraiser’s
optimal-solicitation ordering prescribes the wealthiest donors to be the initial
donor, thereby forcing them into a leadership role. Once asked, the initial donor
has no option but to investigate the quality of the charity - perhaps this is one
22of the justiﬁcations for foundations, and maybe a better understanding of their
work will improve our understanding of how uncertainty aﬀects actual giving
patterns.
23References
Anderson, Lisa R., and Charles A. Holt, “Information Cascades in the Labora-
tory,” American Economic Review, 87(5), 1997, 847-62.
Andreoni, James, “Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The
Limits of Altruism,” Journal of Public Economics, 35, 1988, 57-73.
Andreoni, James, “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory
of Warm Glow Giving,” Economic Journal, 100, 1990, 464-477.
Andreoni, James, “Toward a Theory of Charitable Fundraising,” Journal of
Political Economy, 106 (6), 1998, 1186-1213.
Bagnoli, M. and B. Lipman, “Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing
the Core through Private Contributions,” Review of Economic Studies, 56, 1989,
583-601.
Bolton, Gary E., “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence,”
American Economic Review, 81, 1991, 1096-1136.
Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels, “ERC, A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity
and Competition,” American Economic Review, 90(1), 2000, 166-193.
Cadsby, Charles B., Murray Frank, and Vojislav Maksimovic, “Pooling, Sepa-
rating, and Semiseparating in Financial Markets,” Review of Financial Studies,
3(3), 1990, 315-342.
Cadsby, Charles B., Murray Frank, and Vojislav Maksimovic, “Equilibrium
Dominance in Experimental Financial Markets,” Review of Financial Studies,
11(1), 1998, 189-232
Clark, Kenneth and Martin Sefton, “The Sequential Prisoners Dilemma: Evi-
dence on Reciprocation,” Economic Journal, 111, 2001, 51-68.
24Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel, “Adaptive Learning vs.
Equilibrium Reﬁn e m e n t si na nE n t r yL i m i tP r i c i n gG a m e , ”Economic Journal,
107, 1997a, 553-75.
Cooper, David J., Susan Garvin, and John H. Kagel, “Signaling and Adaptive
Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game,” Rand Journal of Economics, 28(4),
1997b, 662-683.
Dufwenberg, Martin and Georg Kirchsteiger, “A Theory of Sequential Reci-
procity,” unpublished manuscript 1998.
Edles, L. Peter, Fundraising: Hands-on Tactics for NonproﬁtG r o u p s ,M c G r a w
Hill, Inc., 1993.
Falk, Armin and Urs Fischbacher, “A Theory of Reciprocity,” 1998, unpublished
manuscript
Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter, “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 2000, 159-181.
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt, “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and
Cooperation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 1999, 817-868.
Forsythe, Robert, Russell Lundholm, and Thomas Rietz, “Cheap Talk, Fraud,
and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence,”
Review of Financial Studies, 12(3), 1999, 481-518.
Glaser, Amihai and Kai A. Konrad, “A Signaling Explanation for Private Char-
ity,” American Economic Review, 86, 1996, 1019-1028.
Harbaugh, William, “What do Gifts Buy? A Model of Philanthropy and Tithing
B a s e do nP r e s t i g ea n dW a r mG l o w , ”Journal of Public Economics, 67, 1998,
269-284.
List, John and David Lucking-Reiley, “The Eﬀects of Seed Money and Refunds
25on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Cam-
paign,” forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy, 2001.
Loewenstein, George, Leigh Thompson, and Max Bazerman, “Social Utility and
Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 57, 1989, 426-441.
Marx, Leslie, and Steven Matthews, “Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a
Public Project,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, 327-358
Morelli, Massimo, and Lise Vesterlund, “Over Provision of Public Goods,” 2000,
unpublished manuscript.
Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA., 1965.
Pecorino, Paul and Akram Temimi “A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fundrais-
ing: The Role of Refunds,” forthcoming Journal of Public Economic Theory,
2001.
Rabin, Matthew, “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,”
American Economic Review, 83, 1993, 1281-1302.
Romano, Richard and Huseyin Yildirim, “Why Charities Announce Donations:
A Positive Perspective,” Journal of Public Economics, 81, 2001, 423-447.
Silverman, Wendy K., Steven J. Robertson, Jimmy L. Middlebrook and Ronald
S. Drabman, “An Investigation of Pledging Behavior to a National Charitable
Telethon,” Behavior Therapy, 15, 1984, 304-311.
Steinberg, Richard, “The Theory of Crowding Out: Donations, Local Govern-
ment Spending, and the New Federalism.” In R. Magat (Ed.), Philanthropic
Giving: Studies in Varieties and Goals. New York: Oxford University Press,
1989.
26Van der Heijden, Eline, Jan Nelissen, Jan Potters, and Harrie Verbon, “Simple
and complex gift exchange in the laboratory,” forthcoming Economic Inquiry,
2001.
Varian, Hal R., “Sequential Provision of Public Goods, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics,” 53, 1994, 165-86.
Vesterlund, Lise, “Informational Value of Sequential Fundraising,” forthcoming






Text in [] was only included in written instructions for the treatment indicated.  
 
[Upon arrival each subject draws a card form a deck consisting of A-6 hearts and A-6 spades. They are seated at 
terminals labeled with a matching card. This determines their role in the session. When all subjects seated hand 
out instructions and record sheets.] 
 
[Experimenter announces: "We're now ready to begin the experiment. Thank you all for coming. You should all 






This is an experiment about decision making. There are twelve people in this room participating in the 
experiment. You must not talk to the other participants or communicate with them in any way during the 
experiment.  If, at any stage, you have any questions raise your hand and a monitor will come to where you are 
sitting to answer them. 
 
The experiment will consist of eighteen rounds. In each round you will be randomly paired with another 
participant. Your earnings in each round will depend on the decisions made by you and the person you are 
paired with for that round. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in private and in cash, based upon your 
accumulated earnings from all eighteen rounds. 
 
Choices and earnings 
 
In each round you have to choose between two options: A or B. The other person in your pair also has to choose 
between options A and B. 
 
If you choose A, 40 pence are added to your earnings and 0 pence are added to the earnings of the person with 
whom you are paired. Likewise, if the person you are paired with chooses A, 40 pence are added to his or her 
earnings and 0 pence are added to your earnings.  
 
If you choose B, an amount is added both to your earnings and to the earnings of the other person in your pair 
(irrespective of whether that person chooses A or B). Likewise, if the other person in your pair chooses B, an 
amount is added both to his or her earnings and to your earnings (irrespective of whether you choose A or B).  
 
The amount that is added to each person's earnings with a choice of B is called the return from B. This return is 
randomly determined by the computer at the beginning of each round, and will vary from round to round. In any 
round the return is equally likely to be 0 pence, 30 pence, or 60 pence. The return is the same for you and the 
person with whom you are paired in a round. The return may be different for different pairs of participants. 
 
Procedure and information 
 
Six participants have been allocated the role of 'first mover,' the other six have been allocated the role of 'second 
mover.' Upon arrival you have drawn a card. If this card is hearts you are a first mover, if the card is spades you 
are a second mover. Your role will be the same throughout the experiment. 
 
In each round, each first mover will be anonymously and randomly paired with a second mover. This will be 
done in such a way that you will not be paired with the same person two rounds in a row. Nor will you be paired 
with the same person more than three times. You will never know the identity of the other person in your pair, 
nor will that person know your identity. 
 
In the first stage of a round the first mover will enter a choice (A or B). Then, in the second stage, the second 
mover will enter a choice (A or B). Before making his or her choice the second mover [sequential: will] 
[simultaneous: will not] be informed of the first mover's choice. [full info: In each round, both the first mover 
and the second mover will be informed of the exact return from option B (0 pence, 30 pence or 60 pence),   29
before making their choices.] [partial info: In each round, the first mover will be informed of the exact return 
from option B (0 pence, 30 pence or 60 pence) before making his or her choice, but the second mover will not 
be informed about the return from option B before making his or her choice.] 
 
When all the second movers have made their choices, the result of the round will be shown on your screen. The 
screen will list the return from option B, the choices made by you and the other person in your pair, and the 







To make sure everyone understands how earnings are calculated, we are going to ask you to complete a short 
quiz. Once everyone has completed the quiz correctly we will continue with the instructions. If you finish the 
quiz early, please be patient. For each question you have to calculate earnings in a round for you and the other 
person in your pair. 
 
[Experimenter announces: "Now please answer the questions in the quiz by filling in the blanks. In five minutes 
I'll check each person's answers. If you have a question at any time, just raise your hand."] 
 
Suppose the return from B is 0 pence. What will be your earnings and the earnings of the person you are paired 
with if … 
     your     other's 
earnings   earnings 
 
1. you choose A and the person you are paired with chooses A?        
 
2. you choose A and the person you are paired with chooses B?        
 
3. you choose B and the person you are paired with chooses A?        
 
4. you choose B and the person you are paired with chooses B?        
 
 
Suppose the return from B is 30 pence. What will be your earnings and the earnings of the person you are paired 
with if … 
 
        your     other's 
earnings   earnings 
 
5. you choose A and the person you are paired with chooses A?        
 
6. you choose A and the person you are paired with chooses B?        
 
7. you choose B and the person you are paired with chooses A?        
 
8. you choose B and the person you are paired with chooses B?        
 
 
Suppose the return from B is 60 pence. What will be your earnings and the earnings of the person you are paired 
with if … 
 
        your     other's 
earnings   earnings 
 
9. you choose A and the person you are paired with chooses A?        
 
10. you choose A and the person you are paired with chooses B?        
   30
11. you choose B and the person you are paired with chooses A?        
 




[When all subjects have completed quiz correctly, experimenter announces: "Everyone has completed the quiz 




Before we start the experiment let us summarize the rules. The sequence of each round is as follows:  
 
1.  Each first mover is randomly paired with a second mover. 
2.  The return from B is determined: the return is equally likely to be 0 pence, 30 pence or 60 pence. 
3.  The first mover is informed of the return from B and chooses between A and B. 
4.  [full info + sequential: The second mover is informed of the return from B and the first mover's choice, 
and chooses between A and B.] [full info + simultaneous: The second mover is informed of the return 
from B, but not the first mover's choice, and chooses between A and B.] [partial info + sequential: The 
second mover is informed of the first mover's choice, but not the return from B, and chooses between A and 
B.] [partial info + simultaneous: The second mover chooses between A and B (not knowing the return 
from B or the first mover's choice). 
5.  Both the first mover and the second mover are informed of the results of the round and record them on their 
Record Sheet. 
 
After round 18 the experiment ends and each participant is paid his or her accumulated earnings, in private and 
in cash.  
 
[Experimenter announces: "Now, please press the space bar and begin making your decisions. At various times 
you will have to wait for others to make their decisions. When that happens please be patient. If you have a 
question at any time, just raise your hand."]   31
Appendix II 
 
All p-values refer to tests that take an individual session as the unit of observation. 
 
Table A.1: Average Contribution per Session 
   x1  x2  x1  +  x2 
seq_full 43.25  37.50  80.75 
seq_asym 63.00  54.25  117.25 
sim_full 40.75  45.75  86.50 
all rounds 
sim_asym 40.50  36.25  76.75 
seq_full 45.50  40.50  86.00 
seq_asym 62.50  53.00  115.50 
sim_full 48.00  51.50  99.50 
first 9 
rounds 
sim_asym 45.50  40.00  85.50 
seq_full 41.00  34.50  75.50 
seq_asym 63.50  55.50  109.00 
sim_full 33.50  40.00  73.50 
last 9 rounds 
sim_asym 35.50  32.50  68.00 
 
 
Table A.2: Average Individual Earnings (£) per Session 





seq_full 11.67  12.05  23.72 
seq_asym 11.71  12.30  24.01 
sim_full 12.17  11.84  24.00 
all rounds 
sim_asym 10.07  10.36  20.43 
seq_full 12.14  12.48  24.62 
seq_asym 11.96  12.59  24.55 
sim_full 12.80  12.57  25.37 
first 9 
rounds 
sim_asym 10.49  10.86  21.35 
seq_full 11.19  11.62  22.82 
seq_asym 11.47  12.00  23.47 
sim_full 11.54  11.11  22.65 
last 9 rounds 
sim_asym 9.66  9.86  19.52 
   32
Table A.3: Treatment Effects on Contributions: 
p-values for Mann-Whitney U-test (two-sided) 
A: First Contribution: 
All rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.3429 0.3429 
seq_asym   0.0286  0.0286 
sim_full     0.8857 
First  9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.8857 0.6857 
seq_asym   0.0286  0.0286 
sim_full     0.3429 
Last 9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.3428 0.2000 
seq_asym   0.0286  0.0286 
sim_full     0.4857 
 
B: Second Contribution:  
All rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.1143 0.8857 
seq_asym   0.3429  0.0571 
sim_full     0.0571 
First  9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.1143 0.0571 1.0000 
seq_asym   0.8857  0.1143 
sim_full     0.0571 
Last 9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.1142 0.8857 
seq_asym   0.0571  0.0286 
sim_full     0.2000 
 
C: Total Contribution: 
All rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.6857 0.4857 
seq_asym   0.0286  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0571 
First  9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.0571 0.8857 
seq_asym   0.1143  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
Last 9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.0286 0.6857 0.4857 
seq_asym   0.0286  0.0286 
sim_full     0.3429   33
Table A.4: Treatment Effects on Average Earnings per Round:  
p-values for Mann-Whitney U-test (two sided) 
A: Donor 1’s Earnings 
 
All rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.6857 0.1143 0.0286 
seq_asym   0.3429  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
First  9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.8857 0.1143 0.1143 
seq_asym   0.0571  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
Last 9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.3429 0.1143 0.0286 
seq_asym   0.8857  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
 
B: Donor 2’s Earnings 
All rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.8857 0.3429 0.0286 
seq_asym   0.0571  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
First  9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.3429 0.3429 0.0571 
seq_asym   1.000  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
Last 9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.3429 0.1143 0.0286 
seq_asym   0.0286  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
 
C: Total Earnings 
All rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.6857 0.6857 0.0286 
seq_asym   0.8857  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
First  9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.3429 1.0000 0.0571 
seq_asym   0.0286  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 
Last 9 rounds 
 seq_asym  sim_full  sim_asym 
seq_full  0.2000 0.3429 0.0286 
seq_asym   0.2000  0.0286 
sim_full     0.0286 